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MERICANS love babies and technology, and
most Americans applaud the ability of the
new assisted-reproduction techniques to help
infertile couples have children. But these techniques
have also given birth to a wide variety of new legal
issues, including questions about the identity of the
mother and father of the child, the enforcement of
preconception contracts, the elements of informed
consent, and the disposition of frozen embryos. Af-
ter almost 20 years of experience and the growth of
infertility clinics into a multibillion-dollar industry,
it is time to consider establishing national standards
and a federal regulatory scheme. Two recent court
cases, one in California and the other in New York,
and the report of the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law suggest that existing practices are





The California case involved Luanne and John
Buzzanca, who used in vitro fertilization (IVF) with




 The embryos were
subsequently implanted in a genetically unrelated
woman (the “surrogate” mother) for gestation and
birth. The Buzzancas intended to rear the resulting
child as their own. Before the child, Jaycee, was
born, the couple separated and John wanted to have
nothing to do with the child.
At a trial held to determine the legal parents of
Jaycee, the identity of the genetic parents remained
secret, and the gestational mother disclaimed any in-
terest in the child. Because neither John nor Luanne
was genetically or biologically related to Jaycee, the
judge concluded that Jaycee was parentless. In my
view, the conclusion — that a child with six poten-
tial parents (assuming the gestational mother was




This decision was properly reversed on appeal.
The appeals court decided that because, under
California law, a husband who consents to his wife’s
artificial insemination becomes the legal father of
the child, “a husband and wife [should be] deemed
A
 
the lawful parents of a child after a surrogate bears
a biologically unrelated child on their behalf . . .
[since] in each instance a child is procreated because





 Thus, the court concluded
that Luanne and John were Jaycee’s legal parents.
To make sure no one missed the analogy, the
court expanded on it, stating that gestational surro-
gacy and artificial insemination are “exactly analo-
gous in this crucial respect: both contemplate the
procreation of a child by the consent to a medical
procedure of someone who intends to raise the child





 The court did not like the idea of people who
are responsible for the creation of a child “turning





 Since the court believed that John
“caused” the birth of Jaycee simply by signing a con-
tract, the court had no problem concluding that the
same logic that made him the legal father made Lu-
anne (his wife at the time the contract with the sur-
rogate mother was signed) the legal mother, since
she agreed to the “procreative project” at the start.
The appeals court nonetheless concluded that it
would be preferable for the legislature to set the
rules in this arena: “We still believe it is the Legis-





 And at the end of its opinion, the
court tried to reassure John, now the legal father,
that things might work out for the best. The court
conceded that John may have agreed to the surro-
gate-mother arrangement simply “as an accommo-
dation to allow Luanne to surmount a formality” but
observed that “human relationships are not static;
things done merely to help one individual overcome





 Of course, there is no legal basis
for such musings, and the court resorted to citing





 a play about the life of C.S.
Lewis and his marriage to an American citizen, Joy





 Just as a deeper relationship developed
between Lewis and Gresham, the court seemed to
be saying, a deeper relationship may develop be-
tween John and Jaycee, if not between John and his
former wife, Luanne.
 
NEW YORK’S FROZEN EMBRYOS
 
The New York case involved an attempt by Maureen





 Maureen had previously undergone
five egg-retrieval procedures and nine embryo trans-
fers; none resulted in a live birth. Before the 10th
and final attempt, for which Maureen’s sister agreed
to try to carry the couple’s embryos, the couple
signed four consent forms. Included in an adden-
dum to one of the forms was the statement that if
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the couple “no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy
or are unable to make a decision regarding the dispo-
sition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes . . . [they]
may be disposed of by the IVF program for ap-





 Maureen’s sister failed to become
pregnant, and the couple subsequently decided to
divorce.
Maureen then sought sole custody of the remaining
frozen embryos so that she could undergo another
implantation procedure. Steven opposed her re-
quest. The trial court granted custody of the embry-
os to Maureen, but an appeals court reversed this
ruling in a split decision; the majority of the judges
held that the provision that the embryos be turned





was appealed to New York’s highest court, the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the decision that the
couple’s prior agreement, including the provision in
question, should be enforced. The basic reason for
this conclusion was that “advance directives, subject
to mutual change of mind that must be jointly ex-
pressed, both minimize misunderstandings and max-
imize procreative liberty by reserving to the progen-
itors the authority to make what is in the first instance





a document evidences informed, mutual consent,
the court ruled, it should be honored by the courts.
In the court’s concluding words:
 
As they embarked on the IVF program, appellant and
respondent — “husband” and “wife,” signing as such —
clearly contemplated the fulfillment of a life dream of having
a child during their marriage. The consents they signed
provided for other contingencies, most especially that in
the present circumstances the pre-zygotes would be donat-
ed to the IVF program for approved research purposes.
These parties have clearly manifested their intention, the








These cases illustrate the two primary ways in which
clinics and courts have tried to avoid the new legal
issues raised by assisted-reproduction techniques:
application of the sperm-donor model of secrecy to
all aspects of infertility treatment, and dependence on
contracts. Both clinics and courts like contracts, be-
cause they seem to put private, procreation-related
decision making in the hands of the married couple
and permit the courts simply to interpret and en-
force voluntary agreements. The problem, however,
is that much more than contract law is at stake in
these cases. The courts are not simply affirming the
contents of a contract but are implicitly making pro-
found and wide-ranging decisions about the status
of embryos, the interests of children, and the iden-
tification and responsibility of their parents. The in-
adequacy of contract analysis in this area can be seen
by the fact that no court has ever forced any person
to fulfill the terms of a surrogate-mother contract, a
custody contract, or a marriage contract by requiring
that the parties be bound by the contractual terms
regardless of their current wishes or the best inter-





The California appeals court seemed to be simply
honoring a surrogate-mother contract made before
Jaycee’s conception. In fact, however, the court was
implicitly holding that the determination of mother-
hood would be governed by the same rules that the
legislature has adopted to determine fatherhood in
the case of sperm donation. The court seemed to see
this as a neutral approach with respect to sex, but
applying the model of sperm donation to women
devalues both pregnancy and childbirth, since accord-
ing to the court’s analysis, not only the genetic moth-
er (who as a donor of the egg used in the “procre-
ative project” could arguably be considered analogous
to a sperm donor, even though donating eggs is
much more painful and risky than donating sperm)
but also the gestational mother is eliminated from
consideration as the child’s mother. Likewise, the
court decided that because sperm donors have his-
torically had their identities kept secret even from





 keeping the identities of both the egg donor
and the gestational mother a secret is appropriate.
Because both the primacy of the contract and the
value of secrecy can be disputed, it is not surprising









is a strong play, and its main character, C.S. Lewis,
was a great writer, but to cite the play as a basis for
the proposition that “a deeper relationship” may de-
velop between a man and a woman than that con-
templated at the time of a marriage of convenience
misses the point not only of the play itself (which is
about the meaning of suffering) but also of the case
itself (since the marriage had already ended in di-
vorce). For Lewis, the real world was no more than
“the shadowlands” from which we will emerge, like
Plato’s cave-dwelling prisoners, into the afterlife,





The California court’s most important insight was
that courts have an extremely difficult time making
meaningful public policy in the realm of assisted re-
production because they are limited to deciding in-
dividual disputes after the fact, and that the legisla-
ture, which ideally can foresee and prevent disputes, is
therefore the preferred law-making body in this area.
The New York Court of Appeals did not do much
better. The judges seemed to be especially proud of
themselves for affirming the contract (consent form)
the couple had signed (even though it was a tech-
nical, boilerplate form that was difficult to under-
stand). But in affirming the contract, the court
failed to examine the implications of its terms for
public policy. For example, although informed con-
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sent is necessary for research involving human em-
bryos, the gamete donors retain the right to with-
draw their consent at any time. To the extent that
the consent of both parties is necessary for valid
consent to research (and this is what the consent
form required), the withdrawal of consent by either
party should mean that the research cannot proceed.
It may be that the New York court missed this
point because it adopted the language of the con-
sent form, with its meaningless term “pre-zygotes”
(instead of embryos). Other clinics have used the eu-
phemistic term “pre-embryos,” but virtually every-
one has now abandoned the prefix because the most
meaningful distinction is between extracorporeal
embryos (over which male and female gamete pro-
viders have equal say) and implanted embryos (over
which the pregnant woman has the ultimate deci-
sion-making authority). The terms used often deter-
mine the outcome. It is evidence of the court’s confu-
sion that even though the court said it was adopting
the terms used in the consent form, in the opinion,
three different terms are used for the same entities:
embryos, fertilized eggs, and pre-zygotes.
Finally, to the extent that the New York court was
correct in concluding that the couple embarked on
IVF and signed the consent form contemplating
“the fulfillment of a life dream of having a child dur-
ing their marriage,” their divorce put an end to this
dream and radically altered their circumstances. Di-
vorce would seem to be a sufficient change to call
into question the embryo agreement, like the mar-
riage agreement itself, and to provide each former
spouse with the opportunity to revoke it.
 
CASE LAW OR LEGISLATION?
 
These courts arguably did as well as they could,
and reliance on prior contracts as a way to resolve
controversies in assisted reproduction has also been





less, the California court is correct in asking that the
legislature establish rules in this arena. The court’s
opinion, for example, gives no guidance on what
should happen if the gestational mother or the egg
donor changes her mind and wants to be designated
the legal mother with the rights and responsibilities
to rear Jaycee. Must obstetricians and hospitals lo-
cate and interpret contracts to determine who a
child’s legal mother is at the time of birth? Do com-
merce, money, and contracts really have more to say
about motherhood than pregnancy and childbirth?
If we consider the best interests of children more
important than the best interests of commerce, chil-
dren will be best protected by a universal rule that
the woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s
legal mother — with, among other things, the right
to make treatment decisions on behalf of the child





lieve this not because it is the traditional or natural
rule but because the gestational mother is the only
one of the three potential mothers who must be
present at the child’s birth and available to make de-
cisions on behalf of the child. She is also the only
one of the three potential mothers who has a personal
relationship with the child. Decisions about treat-
ment and care of the child must often be made im-
mediately; the issues of long-term care, relinquish-
ment of parental rights, and adoption can be dealt
with later.
Similarly, the New York court acknowledged in its
opinion that the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law recently “issued a comprehensive re-
port . . . together with recommendations for reg-





 The court, however, took no position on
the recommendations themselves, and it is unclear
from the opinion whether the judges actually had an
opportunity to read the report (which was released





THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE
 
This year the New York State Task Force issued
the first comprehensive legislative report on assisted

















 more than a decade ago, and Canada




 The United States
has been slow to regulate the assisted-reproduction in-
dustry because of continuing controversies over abor-
tion and embryo research, as well as our basic belief
that, to a large extent, decisions about assisted repro-





 But certain aspects of these decisions have
such a strong impact on matters of concern to society
— such as child support and care, decisions about
medical treatment and education for children, the
social identity and responsibility of parents, basic in-
formed-consent requirements, and record keeping —




The assisted-reproduction industry caters to the
wishes of adults, and their wishes consistently trump
the interests of children. The abortion model of pri-
vate decision making has been used to resist the reg-
ulation of assisted reproduction (even though what
is sought is the birth of a child, not the termination
of a pregnancy), and the sperm-donor model has
consistently been applied to egg donation, pregnancy,





 Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the
application of the sperm-donor model to virtually all
assisted-reproduction techniques is the insistence on
secrecy — to such an extent that records about
sperm donors and their donations are routinely kept
from the children conceived as a result of the dona-
tions, who are intentionally and systematically de-
prived of knowledge of their genetic parents.
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 Worse, parents may be coun-
seled to lie to their children about their genetic her-






The New York State Task Force recommended ap-
proximately 60 changes in professional standards
and guidelines, 30 changes in state regulation of




 It is not nec-
essary to agree with all these recommendations to
appreciate the number of areas that may require reg-
ulation. The task force was concerned, for example,
about the growing number of multiple pregnancies
resulting from the use of fertility drugs and the im-
plantation of multiple embryos. These practices can
result in multiple births, which are associated with
increased risks of prematurity and low birth weight,
or in fetal reduction (selective abortion of some of the
fetuses). The task force ultimately could not agree
on how to regulate multiple pregnancies. A private
multidisciplinary group has recently recommended
federal legislation to limit the number of implanted




 The task force was also
concerned about the lack of uniform standards for
record keeping, consent procedures and forms, coun-
seling, screening, reporting of success rates, egg do-
nation, and embryo research.
The task force’s most important decision was to
adopt a child-centered perspective that takes serious-
ly the protection of the interests of the children born
as a result of assisted-reproduction techniques — for
example, by identifying the children’s legal parents
and requiring clinics to keep records on behalf of the
children. The most important specific recommenda-
tion was that “New York law should clearly provide
that the woman who gives birth to the child is the
child’s legal mother, even if the child was not con-




 If this rule had
been in effect in California, the dispute there would
not have occurred, since the gestational mother and
her husband (if she was married) or the genetic father
(if she was single) would have been Jaycee’s legal
parents, and they would have had to relinquish their
parental rights to give her up for adoption. The task
force’s recommendations could also have resolved
the dispute in the New York case, since it recom-
mended that use of frozen embryos always require









More important than the rules proposed by the
task force is its attempt to move the regulation of as-
sisted reproduction out of the shadowlands of pri-
vate clinics and the public realm of private disputes
(the courts) into the light of public democratic law-
making. Both the regulation of medicine and family
relations have historically been dealt with under state
law, not federal law. It has seemed reasonable for the
states to handle these issues themselves and for the
law to develop on a state-by-state basis. Nonetheless,
to the extent that assisted reproduction has become
big business and to the extent that it is more accu-
rately characterized as a commercial enterprise than
as a medical or family-related enterprise, federal reg-
ulation of at least its interstate commercial aspects
deserves consideration.
Other countries that have developed uniform stand-
ards for the infertility industry have appointed a com-





 It seems likely that
if we want to consider establishing uniform commer-
cial standards in this country, a similar panel will
have to be appointed by the president. The Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments pro-
vides the best recent model, since it was given a spe-
cific charge, had an adequate budget, and received





The states will, of course, continue to have juris-
diction over determining motherhood, fatherhood,
child custody, and related issues of family law. But
national standards of commerce could be developed
for assisted reproduction, as they have for organ trans-
plantation. A national advisory committee on the new
reproductive techniques should consider uniform
national rules that address the following issues: the
content of informed consent in terms of the risks to
parents and children; standard screening and record-
keeping requirements for egg and sperm donation;
the ability of children born as a result of assisted re-
production to learn the identity of their genetic and
gestational parents; research on human embryos; time
limits on the storage of human embryos; the use of
gametes from deceased persons to produce children;
and the addition of eggs and embryos (and possibly
sperm as well) to the list of human tissues that cannot
be purchased or sold in the United States.
C.S. Lewis, who also wrote children’s books, be-
lieved that a “bad way” to write for children is to do





 Likewise, a bad way to protect the children
who have been conceived and born with the assist-
ance of the new reproductive techniques is simply to
provide the adults involved with what they want. In
late 1997, President Bill Clinton signed a federal law
designed to shift the emphasis in adoption practices





 The assisted-reproduction industry
should move in this direction as well. As with adop-
tion, however, it will probably take federal action to
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